Assessing the impact of microfinance programming on children: an evaluation from post-tsunami Aceh by Stark, Lindsay et al.
Assessing the impact of microfinance programming on children: 
an evaluation from post-tsunami Aceh
Lindsay Stark, Nafessa Kassim, Thalia Sparling, Dale Buscher, Gary Yu, and Neil Boothby1
Abstract
This paper presents an evaluation of the long-term impact of microfinance programmes on 
Acehnese children during the post-tsunami recovery. The study, conducted from June to August 
2010, examined the impact of microfinance programming six years after the tsunami. The sample 
consisted of 185 microfinance participants, with a comparison group of 192 individuals who did 
not participate in microfinance programmes. All respondents were parents, interviewed through a 
structured survey. The study used four child protection indicators—diet, health, childcare and 
education—in contrast to traditional repayment rate indicators. The primary results were 
insignificant with respect to all four child protection indicators, suggesting that, with respect to 
these indicators, there was no long-term difference between the impact of microfinance on 
beneficiaries' children and non-beneficiaries' children. These findings signify a need for 
microfinance actors to move beyond traditional indicators of economic success to evaluate the 
social changes microfinance programmes are presumed to effect.
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Introduction
From June to August 2010 Columbia University, the Women's Refugee Commission and the 
University of Indonesia conducted an evaluation study of the Group Guarantee Lending and 
Savings programme employed by Save the Children in Aceh, Indonesia, as part of its post-
tsunami reconstruction efforts. Taking place six years after the event, the goal of the study 
was to examine the long-term impact of micro-finance initiatives on the well-being of 
Acehnese children. This study was conducted within a social protection framework—an 
increasing area of emphasis within both humanitarian and development contexts. UNICEF 
defines social protection as ‘a set of public and private policies and programmes aimed at 
reducing and eliminating economic and social vulnerabilities to poverty and deprivation’ 
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(UNICEF, 2012, p. 1). Within this framework, child protection actors have emphasised the 
role that social protection initiatives can play in the promotion of children's long-term 
economic and social development, while also reducing children's risk of exposure to 
violence, abuse and exploitation (UNICEF, 2009b).
Increasingly, social protection initiatives have focused on strengthening the financial well-
being of families in order to make additional opportunities available to children such as a 
greater access to education, healthcare, nutritional support and other essential services. This 
study builds on this premise by examining child well-being based on four primary indicators 
that are commonly used within the context of child-focused conditional cash transfer 
initiatives—diet, health, childcare and education—making these areas particularly salient for 
further investigation. In addition, this study contributes to the literature regarding the role of 
microfinance initiatives in the aftermath of complex humanitarian emergencies, both in 
terms of evaluating the efficacy of this approach, and highlighting the need for practitioners 
to place greater emphasis on more robust monitoring and evaluation practices in the early 
stages of programme implementation.
Background
Impact of the conflict and tsunami on Acehnese society
Even before the devastating Asian Tsunami of 2004 the province of Aceh, a region on the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra, was suffering both politically and economically. For decades, 
Aceh served as the battleground for a protracted civil conflict that began in 1976 with the 
Free Aceh Movement fighting for independence against the Indonesian government. This 
30-year conflict resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths and ravaged the social and economic 
fabric of Acehnese society (Roper et al., 2006). Many individuals and families were forced 
to shift from urban lifestyles and jobs to rural livelihoods, such as fishing and agriculture. 
Food production and distribution often proved insufficient, leaving 30 per cent of the 
population living below the poverty line (FAO and WFP, 2005). Due to the imposition of 
martial law in Aceh, few international NGOs were in the region prior to the tsunami to offer 
services to conflict-affected communities, thus leaving the Acehnese with very little support 
or aid (Boothby et al., 2010).
In addition to the hardships imposed by poverty and a long-lasting civil war, on the morning 
of 26 December 2004, northern Sumatra was hit by a 9.0 earthquake, which triggered a 
massive tsunami and flooded 11 countries around the Indian Ocean Rim. Aceh was hit the 
hardest, with an estimated 226,000 dead or missing and approximately 500,000 displaced or 
left homeless (Brennan and Rimba, 2005).
The economic impact was vast, with an estimated USD 4.45 billion in damages to property, 
75 per cent of which occurred in rural areas. This damage was particularly devastating due 
to the fact that a significant number of Acehnese had moved to rural areas during the 
conflict in an attempt to create livelihoods opportunities in areas less affected by the conflict 
(Alexander et al., 2006). The massive waves demolished 63 per cent of fisheries, agriculture 
and commerce—the three largest livelihoods in the Aceh region. Additionally, much of the 
natural environment was destroyed, further diminishing the livelihoods of rural villagers. 
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The environmental damage led to decreased arable land, destroyed coral reefs and rare 
mangrove swamps, and devastated the coastal zone (Alexander et al., 2006). Not only did it 
affect the livelihoods of villagers, it permanently damaged much of Aceh's infrastructure. 
About one third of schools, road networks and hospitals were destroyed. An estimated 
115,000 houses were completely demolished while approximately 150,000 were left in poor 
condition. Overall, the total loss in damages was roughly equal to Aceh's GDP in 2003 
(Athukorala and Resosudarmo, 2006).
Of the hundreds of thousands of people who were killed during the tsunami, it can be 
estimated that 100,000 of these deaths were children (Penrose and Takaki, 2006). 
Devastation continued after the tsunami as well. In a rapid health assessment conducted by 
the World Health Organization young children had one of the highest mortality rates 
following the tsunami, along with adults aged 70 and older (Doocy et al., 2007). This may 
be attributed to a lack of adequate nutrition post tsunami, which had been shown in other 
post-natural disaster contexts to lead to up to 50 per cent of childhood deaths (Pee et al., 
2007). With respect to schooling, while most schools were running two weeks after the 
tsunami, only 50 to 60 per cent of children actually attended them out of fear of another 
tsunami (Pairojkul et al., 2010). Thus, children in post-tsunami affected areas were severely 
affected and were a vulnerable part of the post-tsunami population.
Economic recovery in Aceh through microfinance
In tsunami-affected regions, including Aceh, many economic recovery programmes were 
implemented to assist job creation to rebuild a functioning economy. One model frequently 
used for economic recovery in these areas was microfinance. The World Bank defines 
microfinance as ‘the provision of small-scale financial services to people who lack access to 
traditional banking services’ (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). Frequently targeting women and 
those with limited financial resources (World Bank, 2007), microfinance programmes cover 
a broad range of initiatives, including ‘loans, savings accounts, insurance products and 
various combinations of these services’ (Odell, 2010, p. 6).
The Grameen Bank model of microfinance, first employed in Bangladesh, focuses on 
market-based institutions that offer credit to poor families who do not usually have access to 
credit, in order to increase their income and consumption levels through self-employment 
(Morduch, 1999b). For the past 20 years microfinance has been used throughout the world 
and has been regarded as a successful method to alleviate poverty, thus increasing quality of 
life (CIDA, 2007). Increasingly, microfinance initiatives have also been implemented as a 
means of improving other well-being outcomes, such as ‘health, children's education and 
women's empowerment’ (Odell, 2010, p. 11).
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are widely recognised as the most rigorous means of 
evaluating the impact of microfinance initiatives, in light of their ability to compare 
programme participants against those who did not take part in micro-finance services 
(World Bank, 2007). In addition, RCTs are deemed effective due to their ability to reduce 
the risk of selection bias (Odell, 2010). However, as Odell (2010) notes, RCTs cannot be 
used to examine existing programmes as the structure for evaluation must be established 
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before the programming cycle begins, thereby limiting the ability for RCTs to be used in 
certain contexts where microfinance initiatives are already underway.
Quasi-experimental studies represent another commonly-used approach to evaluating 
microfinance programmes, although the strength of this methodology is regarded to be less 
robust because of the higher risk of selection bias or non-random programme placement 
associated with this approach (World Bank, 2007). Quasi-experimental studies can be either 
prospective, by selecting the treatment and control groups prior to programme 
implementation; or retrospective, in which case the two groups are selected once 
programming has begun (World Bank, 2007).
Despite the widespread popularity of microfinance initiatives among development 
practitioners, a limited evidence base exists by which to examine the impact of these 
programmes. As Bateman (2011) notes, early research on the impact of microfinance 
initiatives—such as the work of Khandker (1998), Littlefield et al. (2003) and others—
reported economic gains among programme participants. Bateman notes, however, that early 
evaluations were primarily carried out by those affiliated with microfinance institutions, 
raising questions of potential bias (Bateman, 2011). Bateman also notes that later research 
carried out by independent investigators—such as Morduch (1998) and Coleman (1999)—
questioned the validity of earlier studies due to ‘data and methodological problems’ 
(Bateman, 2011, p. 2).
Similarly, in a systematic review of microfinance evaluations, Duvendack et al. find a lack 
of rigorous impact studies, and note that the majority of available evaluation reports are 
based on ‘weak methodologies and inadequate data’ (Duvendack et al., 2011, p. 4). They 
also write that four prior reviews of microfinance interventions were conducted (Gaile and 
Foster, 1996; Goldberg, 2005; Odell, 2010; Sebstad and Chen, 1996), and note that each of 
these reviews finds that evidence in support of the impact of microfinance programming is 
based primarily on ‘anecdotes and inspiring stories’ (Duvendack et al., 2011, p. 2) rather 
than scientific investigation.
While research highlighting the positive impact of microfinance programming has 
increasingly been called into question on methodological grounds, Bateman (2011) also 
highlights how new research incorporating the use of RCTs—including the work of Karlan 
and Zinman (2009), Banerjee et al. (2009) and Roodman and Morduch (2009)—has shown 
microfinance interventions to have little to no impact on the economic status or overall well-
being of programme participants. Offering a more nuanced perspective, however, is Bauchet 
et al.'s (2011) review of randomised evaluations, which identifies the results of microfinance 
initiatives to be ‘modest’, producing such outcomes as altering household consumption 
patterns away from non-essential items, and leaving additional income available to promote 
new business development. In addition, Bauchet et al. (2011) find that men benefited more 
than women in the studies they examined, and that there was minimal impact on other 
outcomes such as health and access to education. Similarly, a 2011 review by the 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2011) suggests that there is greater evidence to support 
positive short-term outcomes as a result of microfinance programmes, while the evidence on 
long-term outcomes remains less conclusive.
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Indicators and challenges of successful microfinance programmes
The Grameen Bank model has traditionally used the rate of loan repayment from the 
borrower as its main indicator of success. After 35 years of administering microfinance loan 
programmes in Bangladesh, Grameen reported a success rate of up to 98 per cent repayment 
(Morduch, 1999b). However, the suitability of this indicator to measure programme impact 
has been questioned in recent years. Critics argue that the indicator of repayment rate does 
not measure the social benefits these programmes are meant to foster, nor the negative 
repercussions that may occur from receiving microfinance loans (Banerjee et al., 2010; 
Morduch, 2000). Woolcock (1999), for example, noted that there was little research on the 
wider benefits that microfinance programming is meant to support in addition to increasing 
accounts of conflicting social consequences of these programmes. He provided an example 
of how, in order to pay a microfinance debt, a participant may take another loan from a 
neighbour, thus perpetuating the debt cycle.
In recent years the Grameen Bank has attempted to move beyond repayment rates to assess 
the impacts of microfinance on family income with the development of the Progress out of 
Poverty Index tool (Grameen Foundation, 2012). Additionally, USAID and the Iris Center 
have developed the Poverty Assessment Tools to move beyond repayment rates for 
understanding household well-being on a more significant level (USAID, 2012). Despite 
these advances, however, there is still limited evidence in understanding the impact of 
microfinance programming on the well-being of children and families.
Impact of microfinance with respect to children and families
With respect to the impact of microfinance on children, specifically, some programmes 
seem to have demonstrated positive outcomes. Holvoet (2004) evaluated the impact of 
microfinance programmes in south India and discovered that if a woman was a part of a 
women's group microfinance programme as opposed to a direct bank loan, her children were 
significantly more likely to be in school or even to attend private school. In fact, Holvoet 
(2004) found that the children of microfinance recipients in women's groups were 3.2 to 3.9 
times more likely to be enrolled in private school, and about 2.7 to 3.5 times more likely to 
be capable of reading and writing.
Other programmes, however, seem to have shown mixed results for the children of 
microfinance borrowers. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), for 
example, implemented a multi-country evaluation in India, Egypt, Tanzania and Bolivia, all 
of which have histories of implementing active microfinance programmes (CIDA, 2007). 
The purpose of the evaluation was to examine the participation of children in their parents' 
microfinance programmes, and to understand the overall benefit to children among family 
members who were actively involved in microfinance. The study concluded that when 
family income levels improved, so did their spending on their children's welfare. Education 
was a main focus when income was improved, followed by health care, housing and 
nutrition (CIDA, 2007). Additionally, CIDA found a significant amount of increased 
involvement of children in the businesses their parents had adopted because of the 
microfinance loan. The positive implications appeared to be that the children received 
practical and entrepreneurial skills that could be useful to their future careers. However, 
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CIDA (2007) also discovered that since 80 to 85 per cent of microfinance recipients were 
women, their children were forced to pick up extra roles in the house, increase their time 
spent on business-related activities and household chores, and decrease their time spent on 
schooling. In some cases, children were forced to quit school completely, suggesting a 
negative influence on their future (CIDA, 2007).
Description of Save the Children's microfinance programme in Aceh
Following the tsunami, the international organisation Save the Children implemented a host 
of programmes aimed at different areas of recovery. One of these programmes, the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), provided cash grants and microcredit loans to 
tsunami-affected families. Following the perceived success of the ERP programme, Save the 
Children supported two additional microfinance programmes intended to improve the 
economic security to families affected by both the tsunami and the Acehnese conflict. One 
of these programmes, the Group Guarantee Lending and Savings, was developed in 
collaboration with a local service provider, Baitul Qiradh Afdhal (hereafter referred to as 
‘Afdhal’), to provide loans to women, with the hypothesis that mothers would use the extra 
earned income for the family unit. Afdhal used a ‘group collateral’ approach whereby 
participants were composed of groups of at least 10 women. The hypothesised strength of 
this method was that if one person was unable to make her loan payment, the entire group 
would be held accountable for that payment, increasing the likelihood of repayment. The 
individual defaulter was also expected to repay the group, creating a local form of social 
accountability (Save the Children, 2008).
In order to increase beneficiaries' knowledge about managing finances, Afdhal also 
implemented a savings programme for the borrowers. Save the Children's records indicated 
that as of October 2008, the programme in Aceh reached 2,583 active borrowers and 
distributed approximately USD 108,000 in loans. The savings programme also recorded 
approximately USD 53,000 in individual savings (Save the Children, 2008).
Save the Children's evaluation of the microfinance programme
In 2008, Save the Children implemented a programme evaluation of the Group Guarantee 
Lending and Savings programme. In its evaluation, Save the Children employed a quasi-
experimental design using retrospective sampling, with a control group selected from 
individuals on a waiting list to participate in its microfinance programme at the time the 
evaluation was conducted. Although the findings of this evaluation are limited by its 
retrospective design, its results indicated that programme outcomes were positive. As of 
October 2008, Save the Children's records stated that the repayment rate of loans was 99 per 
cent. The other indicators included, but were not limited to, the following: total outstanding 
loan per month; average net income per month of microfinance clients earned from their 
micro enterprise or business; and percentage of microfinance borrowers who were able to 
support their children more than before as a result of income earned from microfinance 
activities.
The evaluation produced numerous positive conclusions, one of the most significant of 
which was that most microfinance borrowers were food secure. Another was that Afdhal 
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was able to offer microfinance assistance to individuals and families who had no access to 
any form of loans beforehand. Afdhal loan recipients used 97 per cent of their loans to 
improve their business and were successful in increasing their savings and assets. Finally, 
the microfinance programme was able to increase the regular income of the borrowers (Save 
the Children, 2008).
The microfinance evaluation suggested that Save the Children and Afdhal's programme had 
a positive impact on the intervention communities, at least in terms of indicators 
traditionally used to evaluate microfinance programmes (for more information on traditional 
indicators of microfinance, see Morduch, 1999a). Save the Children, however, is an 
organisation devoted to the well-being of children. Save the Children did include one 
indicator of child impact related to economic improvement but, like the other indicators, this 
was based primarily on financial metrics such as increased ability to buy school books for 
children, as opposed to whether a child actually attends school. In other words, although 
Save the Children did evaluate child well-being from microfinance loans through repayment 
rate indicators, it was still a financial metric that lacked any social or protective indicators. 
As such, it is reasonable to conclude that an evaluation examining the programme's social 
impact on children was warranted.
The study
Purpose of the study
In June 2010, Columbia University, the Women's Refugee Commission, and the University 
of Indonesia were invited by Save the Children to undertake an evaluation to examine the 
impact of the Group Guarantee Lending and Savings programme on the well-being of 
children in order to fill the knowledge gap described above. A team of global advisors 
supported the development and oversaw the study. Fieldwork was led by one University of 
Indonesia faculty member, three Acehnese local researchers and two Columbia University 
Masters candidates. A Columbia University faculty member visited the team at the 
beginning of the fieldwork to provide technical support. Research for this evaluation took 
place from June to August 2010, thereby examining the impact of microfinance 
interventions six years after the tsunami.
The study aimed to measure the long-term social impacts of Save the Children's post-
tsunami microfinance programme on children by analysing the effects on health, childcare, 
diet and education. As mentioned in the sections above, in the context of livelihoods 
research, it is commonly assumed that microfinance interventions will be beneficial to low-
income families (Morduch, 1999a). The hypothesis of this study was that microfinance 
programmes would positively influence the children of the beneficiaries with respect to the 
four child protection indicators specified above.
Indicators of the study
The four child protection indicators selected for the evaluation—health, childcare, diet and 
education—were specifically chosen because they are widely recognised global indicators of 
the status of children (UNICEF, 2009a). Additionally, it was agreed that these indicators 
would allow for the evaluation of social and child protection outcomes, moving beyond the 
Stark et al. Page 7









monetary influence on children. Diet was measured through evaluation of the number of 
daily meals and what those meals consisted of with respect to normative foods in that 
region. Health was measured by how often and under what financial circumstances people 
were able to access clinics when needed. Childcare was measured by identifying who was 
caring for younger children, whether parents had time to take care of their children if they 
were working, and how much responsibility older siblings had for childcare. Finally, 
schooling was evaluated by drop-out and school attendance rates.
Methods
Sample
The evaluation targeted populations on the northern coast of Aceh Province—Aceh Utara, 
Bireuen and Lhokseumawe—which participated in the Afdhal micro-lending programme. 
The complete list of recipients, which numbered 10,000, was culled to include only those 
who lived in areas impacted by the tsunami. Recipients from regions that were conflict-
affected but had not been affected by the tsunami were excluded, thus leaving a sampling 
frame of 688 individuals.
Sample size was determined based on an assumed group size of 10, a desired power of 80 
per cent, a confidence level of 95 per cent, an effect size between 0.2 and 0.3, and a design 
effect of two. The effect size estimation was determined to be representative of the level of 
change that psychological and social interventions generally aim to produce (Ager et al., 
2011). A design effect of two was determined because of the ‘clustering’ of programme 
recipients into micro-lending groups of 10 or more to use the ‘group collateral approach’ 
(Save the Children, 2008). As a result, the original desired sample size of 75 was doubled 
and a sample size of 150 was targeted for the intervention group. This number was increased 
to 285 based on the already established groups, and the anticipation of large loss to follow 
up and some refusals to participate in the study.
The comparison group was selected from neighbouring villages, which were matched as 
closely as possible to the villages of the intervention group according to specific criteria. 
The matching criteria included: (1) being in the same district; (2) being similarly affected by 
the tsunami; (3) having a similar geographic make-up (rural versus urban); and (4) having a 
similar population size. Matched communities were also reviewed to ensure similar socio-
economic status before the tsunami. The intervention group earned an average monthly 
salary of IDR 1,299,934 (USD 130), while the comparison group earned an average of IDR 
1,352,485 (USD 135). For additional demographic details of the intervention and control 
groups, see Table 1.
The national research team worked with the village leaders from the intervention villages to 
identify the best matches to be selected as comparison villages. A total of six communities 
were matched with the nine intervention communities (see Table 2).
Because comparison villages did not have clustered groups in the same way that the 
intervention communities did, the research team employed systematic sampling in each 
comparison village. A sampling interval was determined by dividing the total population of 
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the village by the number of desired interviews—to match the number of interviews 
obtained in the corresponding intervention village. If the person selected was not home, 
refused an interview or had participated in a micro-finance programme, a neighbour was 
approached for an interview. As women were the primary targets for microfinance loans, the 
women who took the microfinance loan were the preferred respondents. To accommodate 
cultural standards, however, if the husband wanted to contribute to the responses, his 
feedback was also accepted.
A total of 377 individuals participated in the survey with a total response rate of 67 per cent. 
This included 185 intervention respondents from 19 groups (65 per cent response rate) and 
192 comparison group respondents (68 per cent response rate). The primary reasons selected 
individuals did not participate in the study included not having children (thus making them 
ineligible). Additionally, in the intervention group, there was a small additional loss to the 
primary sample due to selected participants having moved from the area since borrowing 
and due to ‘fictitious borrowers’. The fictitious borrowers came largely from a small number 
of Afdhal borrowing groups. It was assumed that these unknown people were made up in 
order to borrow loans for someone else.
Tools
A structured survey was the main instrument used to evaluate the four child protection 
indicators in this study. The survey was quantitative and consisted of 35 questions that 
covered general demographic information, specific information about family composition 
and economic status as well as key questions targeting the four child protection indicators of 
interest (diet, health, childcare and schooling), based on the definitions of each indicator 
described above. All of the questions relied on a one-year recall period.
General demographic questions sought to understand the household structure and size, 
income levels prior to and following the tsunami, and what type of benefits, if any, the 
family received following the tsunami. The survey was administered as a face-to-face 
interview. Supplemental qualitative data was collected from both adults and children, the 
results of which have been reported elsewhere (Sparling and Gordon, 2011).
Validity and reliability of the survey instrument
An examination of secondary data on school absenteeism was undertaken halfway through 
the research study in order to validate a portion of the findings from the initial survey. 
Gaining permission from parents to examine school records also allowed the team to collect 
a subset of more detailed information on absenteeism, childcare and child labour.
A sub-sample of the original survey sample was selected and those participants were re-
interviewed for two reasons. First, the household survey tool was developed specifically for 
this study and, while it was tested prior to field use, the research team wanted to ascertain 
the validity of certain measures. Primarily, the team desired to test whether there was a bias 
from mothers reporting their children's enrollment at school. The team sensed that there 
could be a recall bias, or the desire to appear favourably in front of foreign researchers 
where there might be something to gain. Second, during the course of research, the research 
team came to learn that some of the measures failed to capture complete data on an original 
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indicator, and the team wanted the opportunity to clarify some trends. For example, in the 
original survey, the research team examined dropping out of school as the main measure of 
‘missed schooling’. Following a preliminary analysis, however, the team decided that 
absenteeism was a better measure for missed schooling in this context, since attrition was 
fairly low.
In each district, one intervention and one comparison village were selected to further 
validate the survey by accessing school attendance records of study participants' children. 
The research team returned to the same villages and found the respondents from both 
intervention and comparison groups, and requested consent to access their children's school 
records. These participants were also asked where their children went to school, how many 
days of school their children missed in May of 2010 and in the past year, and the reasons 
they missed school. The information collected was then compared to the information 
attained in the school records.
A total of 155 respondents from both groups were visited a second time, found to be home, 
and agreed to participate (79 respondents from the intervention group and 76 respondents 
from the control group). Fifty-nine schools were visited, and 315 childrens' school records 
were verified from the families that were re-interviewed.
Data analysis
All data were entered and cleaned in Excel then analysed in SAS 9.2. All tests were run with 
a 95 per cent confidence level and all appropriate tests controlled for age, gender and level 
of tsunami impact. Univariate and bivariate analyses were conducted at the five per cent 
significance level. Continuous covariates were compared across groups using a two-sample 




The multiple logistic regression model was designed to evaluate whether receipt of a 
microloan (Xprime) had an impact on the four primary child well-being indicators, described 
above. The univariate analysis of the primary outcome measures (Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4 = 
enrollment at school until age 18, child attendance at health clinics, primary care-taking 
responsibilities for children, and diversity of available foods and number of meals per day) 
were all null at the five per cent alpha level, controlling for age, gender and the degree to 
which families self-reported the impact of the tsunami on their household (see Table 3).
Health care was measured by whether a child was financially able to attend a clinic when in 
need, and whether economic circumstances (such as work responsibilities or insufficient 
funds) prevented parents from taking the child to a clinic. Both the intervention and 
comparison groups reported adequate health care for their children. Similarly, no significant 
difference was found between the average number of meals a child ate per day or what types 
of foods they generally ate (for example, rice, meat, fish/egg, vegetables and dairy). 
Additionally, no difference was found in terms of the primary caretaker (for example, the 
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mother, father, siblings, neighbour or nanny). Finally, there was no significant difference in 
parental reports of children's school attendance and drop-out rates. The research team found 
no difference between the households that received microfinance and comparable 
households, indicating that the impact of the programme on children was not detectible in 
this context, or that there was no salient benefit for child well-being.
Secondary outcomes
To expand on these primary results, the research team analysed underlying differences or 
ecological variation between the groups with varying loan sizes, using secondary indicators. 
In these bivariate analyses, the team tested the following secondary indicators: self-reported 
income change before the tsunami (T1), immediately after the tsunami (T2), and at the time 
of the survey (T3); usage of assets for business activity; participation of other economic 
assistance programmes, such as cash for work, or asset replacement; and amount of 
livelihood training received.
For the next set of bivariate analysis, the research team tested child enrollment in school and 
absenteeism on parents' income level ‘now’ (T3). The results of these tests were overall not 
statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence level (see Table 4). There was one 
statistically relevant finding, however. Using a two-sample t-test, the average loan amount 
predicted whether recipients were still engaged in that particular business (p = 0.012), which 
provisionally suggests that a higher loan amount could make businesses more sustainable 
over time. Since this was not part of our primary hypothesis, the finding is purely suggestive 
and should be explored further.
In light of the finding above, the team tested how those families with higher loan amounts 
compared to those with lower loan amounts in terms of the primary indicators of interest. 
Among those that received a microfinance loan (n = 183), we dichotomised those that 
received a loan greater than or equal to the mean value of IDR 22.97 million (USD 2,297) 
into a high group versus those that received less than the mean value of IDR 22.97 million 
(USD 2,297) into a low group. Higher loan amount resulted in a higher likelihood trend of 
health, childcare and nutritional child outcomes; yet resulted in a lower likelihood trend of 
child attendance in school. None of these results were found to be statistically significant at 
the five per cent alpha level.
Survey validation outcomes with absenteeism
Paired t-tests were used to compare the average number of reported absences from the 
mother with the average number of reported absences from school records. The difference 
between the average absences reported in May was not statistically significant, suggesting 
that mothers could generally estimate accurately within a month. When running the same 
test using the average absences during the school year, there was a statistically significant 
difference in average absences (t = 2.174, p = 0.032). This suggests that recall bias was too 
great to rely on schooling information remembered for an entire year.
Using the survey validation data, the team tested whether there was a difference between 
group statuses in annual average absenteeism. Since the data came from a smaller sample (n 
= 155), the results of these tests were less robust. However, there were on average 2.5 more 
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days missed per year in the comparison group (9.07 vs. 6.4 days per year, p = 0.0216) 
compared with the intervention group.
In the survey, school absence was categorised as ‘unexcused’ or ‘excused’, which included 
illness and family affairs. The difference in total absenteeism between groups was consistent 
with the results of testing ‘unexcused’ versus ‘excused’. The comparison group, on average, 
missed 5.7 days without parental excuse annually, compared to the intervention group 
missing 3.5 days. However, the difference in absences, whether they were excused or 
unexcused did not suggest significantly relevant issues in this situation, since two extra days 
of school is unlikely to have a significant impact on child well-being (see Table 5).
Discussion
The findings of this study indicate that there was no apparent long-term difference when 
comparing the intervention and comparison group, with respect to the four child protection 
indicators. As mentioned above, health care was measured by whether a child was able to 
attend a clinic when in need, and if economic circumstances prevented parents from taking 
the child to a clinic. The lack of a statistical difference between the two groups was 
attributed to the government social welfare system (Jaminan Pengamanan Sosial), which 
includes free health care, and was reported to address health needs adequately in both study 
populations.
Both groups appeared to have similar access to food. Meat was reported to be prohibitively 
expensive for many of the families, with the main protein source reported to be dried fish. 
There was some variation in the number of meals per week that included meat, vegetables 
and dairy, but these trends seemed to follow the poverty level of each family, and were not 
different based on intervention or comparison status.
Although there were no notable differences between intervention and comparison groups, 
findings indicate that primary care-taking of younger children is mostly undertaken by older 
siblings. This raises questions about the burden of responsibility that is placed on young 
people in this context. Studies in contexts such as sub-Saharan Africa have found that young 
people often feel overwhelmed by their care-taking responsibilities and feel that they lack an 
adult who they can turn to for advice and guidance. This research has suggested that these 
young caretakers and their younger siblings appear to be particularly vulnerable to negative 
outcomes in schooling, health and emotional well-being (Evans, 2010; Save the Children, 
2010).
Certain findings of this study contradict previous evaluations of microfinance programmes. 
For example, unlike the CIDA (2007) report, this research found there was no increase in 
school drop-out rates associated with participation in a micro-finance programme. In another 
study, Holvoet (2004) found that children of mothers who participated in group 
microfinance programmes were more likely to stay in school, while this study found that 
children were just as likely to be in school whether their mothers participated in a 
microfinance programme or not. This suggests that more studies fusing economic indicators 
and child protection indicators such as schooling need to occur in order to find consistency.
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These findings do not imply that economic rehabilitation programmes are unnecessary or 
unproductive. However, this evaluation suggests that it might be necessary to include other 
social indicators that match an organisation's mission, such as child protection indicators in 
the case of Save the Children. Those indicators would allow programme implementers to 
better understand social outcomes, in addition to financial ones. With more complete 
information, organisations can better adapt their micro-finance programmes to accommodate 
the financial and social needs of programme participants. In their programme evaluation, for 
example, Leatherman and Dunford (2010) identified a significant problem in health within 
the region they were working, and built in a health-training component to their microfinance 
programme. The programme was then shown to be successful in improving the livelihood 
and health of the participants. For example, with respect to diarrhoeal diseases, when 
microcredit alone was given in the Dominican Republic, there was no change in diarrhoeal 
disease. When health education was provided alone, the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases 
decreased by 29 per cent; however, when health education was coupled with microcredit, the 
incidence decreased by 43 per cent. Our study suggests that more research is needed to 
establish a positive association between microfinance and child well-being, possibly at 
earlier stages in a programme cycle in order to maximise desired impact.
In addition, this study highlights the need for a greater emphasis on monitoring and 
evaluation among humanitarian practitioners, in order to allow for more rigorous evaluations 
to be conducted at a later date. In the absence of randomised controlled trials or quasi-
experimental studies with retrospective designs, it becomes difficult to draw strong 
conclusions regarding the impact of microfinance initiatives. In this way, the possibility 
exists that retrospective studies, such as this one, more accurately can be described as 
measuring the difference between intervention and control groups rather than providing 
evidence of a particular programme's impact. In the case of this study, since research was 
conducted six years after the tsunami, it could be that other factors aside from participation 
in microfinance programming could have contributed to the study's findings, suggesting the 
need to consider both economic and non-economic outcomes concurrently.
Limitations
There are several limitations that need to be considered when evaluating the study. First, the 
study design was retrospective, which results in disadvantages such as respondents 
potentially over-exaggerating or minimising the events, or recall bias.
As previously mentioned, randomised controlled trials represent the most robust method of 
measuring the impact of microfinance initiatives, followed by quasi-experimental studies 
that employ a prospective design. In the case of this study, however, these approaches were 
not possible in light of the fact that programming had already been implemented prior to the 
time that both intervention and control groups were selected.
Although the study would have been strengthened had it been prospective in nature, the 
enormity and complexity of the post-tsunami response led implementing agencies to 
prioritise programming over measurement in the initial phases of their work, so as to address 
the most immediate needs of survivors. In addition, the decision to delay the implementation 
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of particular programmes in order to randomise participants post-emergency would likely 
have brought its own set of criticisms and negative attention. At the same time, it is the 
opinion of the authors that the field of emergency response is beginning to embrace an 
emphasis on the importance of rigorous evaluations, although a tension still remains 
between response and measurement, particularly in a setting as all-encompassing as the 
tsunami.
Additionally, a time analysis was not incorporated into the survey, meaning that while no 
statistically significant difference between the intervention and comparison group was found 
with respect to the microfinance programme's influence on child protection indicators, the 
research team does not know whether the intervention group was better off than the 
comparison group anytime before the evaluation was done. This means the intervention 
group could have risen out of poverty faster because of the microloans, and levelled out a 
few years later. Unfortunately, the study design did not allow for this measurement.
An important limitation was that some of the case definitions for this study were found to be 
‘muddy’ and could have used further clarification. For example, for the education indicator, 
the term ‘dropped out’ was not fully defined. ‘Dropped out’ could have implied a child who 
had not gone to school for months but intended to return (recidivism), or a child who never 
intended to return to school (attrition). The impact of this limitation on the study's findings, 
however, is minimal: only a small number of respondents reported dropping out, making 
their input into the study not statistically significant. However, greater attention to this issue 
at the design phase would have increased the study's validity, and is an issue worthy of 
consideration within the context of future research.
Two different sampling methods were employed to survey the intervention group and 
comparison group. This was done because the research team used the Afdhal list of lending 
groups for the intervention group; however, there was no comparable group list for the 
comparison villages. This might have lead to undetected differences in the groups, either 
created or concealed by the different sampling methods. Finally, the tsunami response was 
ubiquitous.
Although the research team attempted to identify matched communities that did not receive 
microfinance as the comparison group, it is possible there could have been a spill-over affect 
of the benefits from the intervention area to the communities that did not receive those 
programmes.
In order to address this limitation, researchers took care in selecting participants for the 
comparison group, attempting to identify control villages that were similar to the 
intervention areas prior to the tsunami, and which were affected in a similar way. As such, it 
was feasible to propose that control areas could have been equally eligible for the same type 
of microfinance programming being provided in intervention locations. Within these 
villages, women for the control group were selected, although it was not possible to 
determine which of these women would have been selected for microfinance initiatives. The 
decision to select control participants in this way was made in light of an absence of 
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naturally occurring groups of similar women in intervention areas who had not participated 
in microfinance programming.
As a result of the way in which the control participants were selected, it is possible that the 
women in these groups possessed a slightly different economic status to those in 
intervention areas. However, given the overall economic similarities between the 
intervention and control areas, significant differences in the economic status of women in 
each location is unlikely.
Another potential limitation is the fact that child well-being was measured from the 
perspective of the parents and not by the children themselves in this study using indicators 
that were determined based on international standards alone. Future research may look to 
incorporate child-centered research methods using a combination of international and locally 
defined indicators in order to provide insight into how children perceive and experience the 
benefits of microfinance on their lives. This could present the opportunity for the 
development of more precise and locally meaningful measurements that are better able to 
detect levels of child well-being. While the use of case studies could have facilitated a 
greater reflection of children's perspectives in the study, the time and logistical constraints of 
this study due to other research objectives did not make such an approach possible.
Conclusion
There are significant questions that arise from this study on microfinance programmes and 
how ‘success’ is currently determined. Although microfinance programmes may appear to 
be successful when evaluated by repayment rate indicators, they might not be highly 
successful when considering other important factors, such as child well-being or even the 
social impact on the primary borrower.
If the larger scope of a programme is to aid beneficiaries to lift themselves out of poverty, 
then other determinants of economic and social mobility, such as education and health care 
accessibility, must also be taken into account when assessing programme efficacy.
There are currently no standardised or validated approaches for measuring the impact of 
microfinance on children beyond economic indicators, such as repayment rates. This 
evaluation offers one attempt to fill this gap in the existing literature, and attempts to 
demonstrate that relying on traditional evaluation indicators alone is not enough to 
understand how livelihood programmes are affecting children. These efforts have larger 
implications within the field of microfinance, in terms of measuring efficacy of programmes 
and true social changes in the lives of the children of borrowers. The subject warrants 
further study to continue to build the evidence base for linkages between livelihoods and 
child protection.
This study also contributes to the literature regarding the role of microfinance initiatives in 
the aftermath of complex humanitarian emergencies, both in terms of evaluating the efficacy 
of this approach, and highlighting the need for practitioners to place greater emphasis on 
more robust monitoring and evaluation practices in the early stages of programme 
implementation. As this study suggests, additional rigorous evaluations of microfinance 
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initiatives are needed in order to better understand the impact of these interventions in 
emergency contexts, and throughout the transition from relief to development.
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics of intervention and control groups
Characteristic Intervention group Control group P-value







Female respondent 163/180 (90.6%) 166/193 (86.0%) P = 0.174
Male respondent 17/180 (9.4%) 27/193 (14.0%)
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Table 2
Sample selection for matched communities
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Table 4
Secondary outcomes and demographic analysis
Indicator Test statistic P-value
Demographic/secondary outcomes:
Overall income change: (income fluctuation before, after and now from 
tsunami between groups)
• Income before tsunami vs. income 
now t-test = -0.1505;
• Income before tsunami vs. income 
after the tsunami t-test = 6.4845;





Size of loan and still engaged in business: (does X still have original 
business, Y vs. N)
t = 0.6734 P = 0.5016
Amount of loan and still being engaged in the business: (Y vs. N) t = -2.5376 P = 0.012 **
Poverty and school enrollment (poor now and no school) x2 = 0.3408 P = 0.5590
Other economic assistance: (did groups differ on amount of assistance?) 
N=
• cash for work x2 = 0.1092 P = 0.741
• asset replacement x2 = 2.9175 P = 0.088
• training x2 = 7.3090 P = 0.007**
• all forms combined x2 = 3.1828 P = 0.315
Poverty and school absence t = -1.7277 P = 0.0864
Note:
**
= significance at the p < 0.05 level.
Source:authors.
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Table 5
Absenteeism and survey validation
Indicator Test statistic P-value
Validation of survey tool: N = 155
Annual days missed (average between groups) t = 2.3243 P = 0.02**
Unexcused absence (average between groups) t = 2.0753 P = 0.04**
Mother-reported vs. school record-reported (comparing average number reported)
• May average t = 1.23 P = 0.22
• annual average t = 2.1737 P = 0.03**
Child participation after school in:
• business (y vs. n) x2 = 0.0995 P = 0.75
• childcare (y vs. n) x2 = 0.4636 P = 0.496
Note:
**
= significance at the p < 0.05 level.
Source: authors.
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